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ABSTRACT  
Abstract: This paper, drawing primarily on the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) theoretical 
approach to political economy and the institutional theory of Europeanisation with 
emphasis on the Quality of Government (QoG) approach, examines possible variation 
between Greece and Portugal, in terms of their responses to pressures from 
Europeanisation before the crisis, as well as to MoU conditionality during the crisis. The 
empirical evidence seems to vindicate the fundamental assumptions of the VoC approach 
about the impact of variation among member states of the Eurozone, in terms of models 
of capitalism/political economy, on the crisis in Greece and Portugal. However, QoG is 
identified as key explanatory variable for variation in adaptation/adjustment capacity 
between the two countries, especially during the crisis. Additionally, there seems to be no 
evidence that cultural aspects, such as the level of social trust/ capital, can account for 
variation in adaptation performance between the two countries during the crisis.             
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1. Introduction  
 
EU periphery in general and Southern Europe in particular came to be viewed as the main 
loci of the economic crisis that affected the Eurozone as a repercussion of the financial 
crisis and Great Recession that began in 2008-09 and is considered as the worst 
experienced by the developed democracies since World War II. Yet, while the 
international crisis itself may be considered as an outcome of the institutional architecture 
of the neo-liberal era of the last thirty years, manifested itself primarily in poor economic 
governance of globalisation, especially in the areas of regulation of financial markets 
(Admatti and Hellwig, 2013) and in increasing levels of inequality (Bartels, 2008; Hall, 
2013; Blyth, 2013; Piketty, 2014), the crisis facing the Southern European countries is 
actually further exacerbated by the poor/doomed to failure construction of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) (Hall and Franzese, 1998; McKay, 1999). Indeed, the outbreak of 
the international economic crisis revealed the fundamental institutional weaknesses of 
the EMU, namely the discrepancy between a properly institutionalized monetary policy 
and a rather weak economic policy component, actually a symptom of an incomplete 
Optimal Currency Area (OCA) (see Mundell, 1961; Eichengreen, 1990). These structural 
imbalances of EMU permitted the adoption by the member states of divergent economic 
policies, resulting in divergent economic trajectories (Pisani-Ferry, 2006; Wyplosz, 2006; 
De Grauwe, 2011; Featherstone, 2011; Hall, 2012, 2014). Thus, the first years of the EMU, 
contrary to expectations for economic convergence, resulted in large deviations in terms 
of implemented policies and performance among EMU countries. Moreover, the weak 
institutional formulas for effective and efficient coordination of economic policies, mainly 
in the form of the Growth and Stability Pact (SGP), proved unable to ensure the 
implementation of fiscal discipline (Begg, 2011; Gros, 2011; Hall, 2012, 2014). In these 
circumstances, the need for economic assistance in crisis-hit countries led to the creation 
of a hybrid scheme that brought together the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB, 
the so-called Troika, which assumed the responsibility of the adjustment programmes, the 
so called Memorandums of Understanding-MoUs, for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, 
accompanied by strict policy conditionality. Yet, despite the fact that the content of the 
adjustment programmes seems to have been based on the same fundamental principles, 
external constraints do not directly impact on institutional and policy change in the 
countries concerned. On the contrary, they are mediated by a wide range of domestic 
institutions. Indeed, national political economies vary on the basis of historically 
contingent foundations, which over time have forged distinct institutional traditions and 
legacies (Thelen, 1999). Therefore, one should not expect homogeneity, but rather 
variation in countries' responses to external policy conditionality.  
 
This paper, while taking into account the intensity of external constraints/policy 
conditionality (Europeanisation-induced and MoU-induced), draws on the new 
institutionalist approaches to domestic change and concentrates on crucial aspects of the 
domestic institutional infrastructure that are best captured by the literature(s) of varieties 
of capitalism (VoC) and quality of government (QoG), as determinants of domestic policy 
and institutional change in Southern Europe. These approaches point to the crucial role of 
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domestic formal and informal institutions as determinants of domestic policy change and 
performance. Moreover, it is worth reminding that, while the literature on external 
institutional constraints emphasises the possibility for achieving convergence, the 
institutionalist literature, and especially the varieties of capitalism and quality of 
government approaches, point toward divergence among national political economies 
(see Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall, 2010; Iversen and Soskice, 2006, 2009; Pierson, 2000, 
2001; Schmidt, 2002; Hancke et. al., 2007; Featherstone, 2008; Bohle and Greskovits, 
2009, 2012; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; Rothstein, 2012). The first section presents the 
theoretical framework/research puzzle of the paper, combining aspects of the varieties of 
capitalism and quality of government literatures. The second section briefly examines the 
possible variation between Greece and Portugal in response to pressures from the 
Europeanisation process before the onset of the crisis. The third section concentrates on 
identifying variation between Greece and Portugal in response to MoU conditionality. The 
fourth section focuses on accounting for possible variation in responses to external policy 
conditionality between the two countries. Finally, the penultimate section summarises the 
main findings with regard to variation in domestic responses to external constraints 
before and during the crisis in Greece and Portugal. 
 
 
2. Varieties of Capitalism, Quality of Government and Crisis in 
Southern Europe 
 
The concepts of ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ and ‘Quality of Government’ are widely 
considered as crucial aspects of domestic institutional infrastructure with broad 
resemblance to the areas of state-economy and state-society relations respectively. The 
notion of ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (VoC) refers to a very influential theoretical approach to 
political economy and public policy/comparative capitalism developed by P. Hall and D. 
Soskice (2001). It involves a shift away from the dominant theories of comparative 
political economy/capitalism, namely the modernisation theory, the neo-corporatist 
theory, and the so called social systems of production approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001), 
towards a rather holistic approach strongly influenced by the literature of the economics 
of organisation (Williamson, 1985). In this framework, the VoC approach regards 
‘companies as crucial actors in capitalist economy’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001:6) and hence as 
key agents of adjustment to technological change and national economic performance at 
large. Thus, given that national political economies can be compared by reference to the 
way in which firms (and/or firms associations) resolve their coordination problems, there 
have been identified two ideal types of political economies: liberal market economies 
(LMEs); and coordinated market economies (CMEs). While in LMEs firms’ coordination 
takes place primarily via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements, in CMEs firms 
rely more heavily on non-market relationships, namely strategic interaction, with other 
actors to coordinate their activities.  
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Obviously, LMEs comprise primarily the Anglo-Saxon countries (i.e. UK, US, Australia, New 
Zealand etc.), while CMEs refer primarily to northwestern continental European countries 
(i.e. Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Scandinavia) and Japan (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Within this analytical framework, the role of formal, but primarily informal, institutions is 
crucial. In particular, as it has long been identified by the institutionalist literature, 
economic actors’ preferences and choices are structurally embedded, and therefore 
institutional embeddedness is considered as a key feature of the way in which national 
and/or regional economies are organized and perform (see Shepsle, 1986; Hall and Taylor, 
1996; Hall and Soskice, 2001). In that respect, the notion of institutional 
complementarities constitutes a crucial component of the VoC approach. This notion 
suggests that nations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of political 
economy should be expected to develop complementary practices in other spheres as 
well. For instance, highly developed stock markets tend to be associated with market 
modes of coordination in the financial sector and low levels of employment protection, 
while high levels of employment protection tend to reflect higher levels of non-market 
coordination in the sphere of industrial relations. In this framework, the concept of 
comparative institutional advantage is crucial for understanding variation in economic 
performance both at the domestic and international levels. Hence the VoC approach 
identifies linkages between specificities of institutional frameworks and different types of 
innovation. In particular, the institutional framework of LMEs is considered to be more 
suitable for supporting radical innovation which entails substantial shifts in product lines 
and/or major changes to the production process at large, while the institutional 
framework of CMEs is more appropriate for incremental innovation, which is characterised 
by rather gradual, continuous, small-scale improvements to existing production processes 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). Obviously, this distinction has serious implications for identifying 
variation in patterns of adjustment, economic performance and development across 
countries and/or regions, as well as in comparative public policy-making.  
 
However, it seems that the Southern member-states of the EU do not fit with any of the 
ideal types of VoC. Although some of these countries may demonstrate similarities to the 
CMEs (Hall and Gingerich, 2009), they are characterised by ‘statist’ political economy, 
involving heavy regulation of financial, product and labour markets and more substantial 
state holdings in the economy than most other European countries (Schmidt, 2002; Levy, 
2006). In relation to labour market, in particular, although southern European countries 
are considered as having relatively regulated labour markets, some parts of the labour 
force, the so called ‘outsiders’, face a highly deregulated environment in black and ‘grey’ 
economies (Rueda, 2007; Graziano, 2004). This relates to what may be called ‘obscured 
dualisation’, namely a process of dual labour market which ensures that the egalitarian 
effects of regulation extend only to a comparatively small part of the workforce, leaving 
the rest exposed to deregulated labour markets, similar in many respects to the LMEs 
(Palier and Thelen, 2012)3. Moreover, the job protection offered to the more privileged 
                                                 
3 It needs to be stressed, though, that dualisation, associated with institutional drift taking place in 
continental European political economies, such as Germany, is considered as one among three main 
  
 
4 
sectors of the workforce impedes labour market adjustment (Esping-Andersen, 1996). 
Clearly, this statism has its roots in longstanding institutional arrangements and the 
intricate nature of legal systems, the so called legalistic traditions (Hopkin and Blyth, 
2012), which have significant distributive consequences, shifting resources towards 
relatively inefficient parts of the economy with little scope for productivity growth, such 
as small-scale retail and legal services. Thus product market regulation and associated 
rent-seeking have anti-competitive, as well as inegalitarian consequences, depressing both 
efficiency and equity (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2006; Hopkin and Blyth, 2012). This 
combination of hybrid statism, inefficiency and inequality has been best captured by a 
new type/variety of capitalism, the so called mixed market economies (MMEs) (see inter 
alia Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Amable, 2003; Amable and Palombarini, 2009; Hall and 
Thelen, 2009; Featherstone, 2008; Hopkin and Blyth, 2012). What this hybrid variety 
implies is that southern European economies, despite reluctant privatisation and supply-
side reforms undertaken in the 1990s, are still heavily constrained by legalistic state 
intervention (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2006)4. Hence statism, as the main feature of 
embedded illiberalism in the economies of southern Europe, is linked to problems of weak 
job growth and low overall levels of employment, patchy and selective welfare provision 
(Ferrera 1998; Lynch 2006), and regulatory measures that actually protect inefficient 
producers of goods and services from competition. 
 
Nonetheless, most of the pathologies of south European capitalism or MMEs mentioned 
above are best captured by the concept of quality of government (QoG), and, indeed, 
southern European countries appear to demonstrate, in varying degrees, rather low 
performance in several QoG indicators, such as clientelism, corruption, rule of law, 
impartiality, effectiveness and efficiency of state bureaucracy and so on. In that respect, it 
is assumed that southern Europe is characterised by a particular type of state intervention 
                                                                                                                                                    
trajectories of liberalization. Other trajectories include deregulation, mostly associated with institutional 
displacement within LMEs, and embedded flexibilisation, an Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) identified 
with conversion, and considered as a key feature of the Scandinavian liberalization trajectory (see Thelen, 
2012).     
4 It should be reminded, however, that another variety of capitalism, primarily identified with the cases of 
Latin America, but also with some resemblance to parts of Southern Europe (i.e. Spain and Portugal), are the 
‘Hierarchical Market Economies’ (HME) (see Schneider, 2009). HMEs demonstrate important similarities to 
the MMEs, but primarily draw on relations between major multinational companies, the so called ‘Grupos’, 
and the political system. A key feature of HMEs, from a socio-economic point of view, is the predominance 
of hierarchical relations, notably with particular reference to the role of the state and multinational 
companies in Latin America, and especially to the state’s dependence on the latter. Additionally, a more 
recently emerged variety of capitalism is the ‘Dependent Market Economies’ (DMEs) with almost exclusive 
reference to ex-communist countries of East-Central Europe (ECE) (see Noelke and Vliegenthart, 2009; 
Bohle, 2010; Bohle and Greskovits, 2007, 2009). The main feature of DMEs is their dependence on 
Transnational Companies in almost all aspects of their political economies. Such dependence has resulted 
from influx of Foreign Direct Investment following the collapse of communism and the rapid privatization 
programmes put forward during the 1990s in almost all CEE countries. Although DMEs demonstrate obvious 
similarities to both MMEs and HMEs, they tend to share very identical and crucial common characteristics 
that differentiate them from the other models and relate to all spheres of political economy (corporate 
governance, industrial relations, vocational training, innovation transfer, and welfare regime). 
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that has serious inegalitarian and inefficient implications. Hence quality of government 
has emerged as an additional factor, particularly relevant to the crisis in southern Europe. 
The notion of quality of government draws on a key theoretical assumption of 
institutionalist theory, namely the distinction between redistributive and efficient 
institutions (see Rothstein, 2012; Tsebelis, 1990). While the former imply formal or 
informal rules (e.g. tax system, welfare state, corruption, familism, etc.) that transfer 
resources and power from one group of actors/agents to another, the latter refer to 
formal -but primarily informal- rules of the game (i.e. impartiality, rule of law, control of 
corruption, trust, civil service ethos) that improve the position of all actors. Although this 
distinction may be viewed as partly vague, given that even efficient institutions may have 
at least indirect redistributive effects, the academic debate on the potential trade-off 
between efficiency and redistribution, and hence levels of equality/inequality, is an old 
and very important one in the social sciences (see inter alia Iversen and Soskice, 2006, 
2009; Hopkin and Blyth, 2012). In this theoretical framework, the term “QoG” refers 
broadly to features of the so called “output side” of politics, primarily to institutions, such 
as the principle of impartiality, that enhance efficiency in policy implementation and in the 
exercise of power at large, as one source of political legitimacy. Obviously, this contrasts 
the more traditional source of legitimacy, namely the “input side” linked to access to 
power, namely electoral democracy and representation. In this respect, theorised by 
Rothstein and others, but also long operationalised by the World Bank, the concept of 
“QoG” comprises variables, such as rule of law, property rights, control of corruption, 
voice and accountability, government effectiveness and bureaucratic efficiency, regulatory 
quality (see Rothstein, 2012; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008), while in a recent study for the 
EU Commission a composite index to measure quality of government as a single variable 
has been developed (CEC, 2010b).  
 
Hence, quality of government fundamentally implies a shift from particularistic to 
universalistic institutions and universalism at large (Acemoglou, et. al., 2012; Acemoglou & 
Robinson, 2012). In that respect, it may affect the character and performance of crucial 
redistributive institutions, such as the welfare state, and hence it is considered as 
complementary to “power resource theory-PRT” in accounting for existing variation 
among types of welfare state and/or patterns of redistribution across countries and 
regions (Iversen, 2005; Iversen and Stephens, 2008; Iversen and Soskice, 2009; Rothstein, 
2012). Yet, the crucial question in this regard is who might have an incentive to provide 
efficient institutions. Indeed, given that the provision of efficient institutions constitutes a 
second order dilemma of collective action and hence no actor has any clear incentive to 
provide such institutions, the notion of “QoG” relates to the so called “social trap” 
phenomenon, and subsequently to the problems of stickiness and virtuous and vicious 
cycles that are intrinsic to the notion of institutional change (see inter alia Rothstein, 
2005). It is in that respect that QoG is closely associated with the institutional theory of 
trust and social trust at large5 (Rothstein, 2012; Paraskevopoulos, 2010, 2012).     
                                                 
5 The relationship between QoG and social and institutional trust is a complicated one. In particular, while, 
as it has been established in the literature, institutional performance and not culture determines trust in 
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In this theoretical framework, the VoC approach, in order to account for the Euro crisis, 
points to a fundamental discrepancy between the institutional complementarities/ 
specificities of the so called “export-led” growth strategies/models, pursued by northern 
European member states of the Eurozone, such as Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and 
Finland, and those of the “demand-led” growth strategies, pursued by southern member 
states, notably Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and France (see Hall, 2012, 2014). The former 
are essentially based on the institutional infrastructure of CMEs, involving high levels of 
wage coordination, advanced systems of vocational training and strong emphasis on 
research and development facilitated by dense inter-firm collaborative networks that 
substantially contribute to continuous innovation. These institutional capacities facilitate 
export-led growth strategies in northern European countries, by restraining the rate of 
growth of labour costs through wage coordination and by investing in advanced vocational 
training schemes to encourage high value-added production and incremental innovation, 
thus allowing firms to compete both on quality and price. Such strategies, however, are 
closely associated with neutral or moderate macroeconomic stance, because 
expansionary policy can set off wage-price spirals and counter-cyclical policy is less 
effective where a workforce with high levels of industry-specific skills prefers high savings 
ratios (Hall, 2012, 2014; Soskice 2007; Katzenstein 1985). In that respect, the countries of 
Northern Europe have been rather well-placed to take advantage of the single currency by 
exploiting the inability of their trading partners to devalue, thus continuing their export-
led growth strategies. Thus countries of northern Europe began to build up large balance 
of payments surpluses, based on containment of wage costs (Hall, 2012, 2014).  
 
Conversely, the economies of southern Europe lacked the institutional infrastructure that 
would be conducive to wage coordination, given that both trade unions and employer 
associations are rather fragmented and weak with regard to negotiating wage bargains 
                                                                                                                                                    
institutions (see Mishler and Rose, 2001), social trust and social capital at large can positively influence that 
performance and therefore can play a crucial indirect role in enhancing institutional trust. In that respect, 
the institutional theory of trust attributes an important role to the perceptions of fairness and impartiality of 
public institutions on the part of citizens as a crucial variable affecting the creation of generalized/social 
trust (see Rothstein, 2005, 2012; Paraskevopoulos, 2010). Additionally, Carles Boix and Daniel Posner (1998) 
have identified five mechanisms on the relationship between social capital, institutional performance and 
good government. The first mechanism points to social trust/capital as a tool for empowering and actually 
transforming citizens through achieving collective action into "sophisticated consumers of politics" in an 
environment dominated by electoral competition. According to the second mechanism, social trust 
facilitates rule compliance through the reduction of transaction costs, namely by reducing the need for 
bureaucratic, complex, and expensive mechanisms of enforcement. The third mechanism underlines the 
benefits of civic virtue, namely the social capital-driven shift from particularistic to more community-
oriented concerns of citizens that in turn promotes good governance. The fourth mechanism refers to social 
trust as a tool for achieving bureaucratic efficiency through its capacity to facilitate the resolution of 
collective action problems within state bureaucracies and thus to promote better coordination between 
principals and agents at any hierarchical levels. Finally, the fifth model identifies social trust as a crucial 
concept for achieving consociationalism among antagonistic elites without using formal institutions. Hence, 
overall, one should expect a rather strong correlation - linked to virtuous or vicious cycles- between QoG, 
social and institutional trust.     
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(Hall, 2012, 2014; Hancké 2013; Lavdas, 2005). Additionally, employer associations are 
rather poorly institutionalized and hence poorly equipped to promote collaborative 
vocational training, as well as research and development activities. Thus innovation is 
difficult to achieve and firms tend to build their competitive advantage on low-cost labour 
(Hall, 2012, 2014; Hall and Gingerich, 2009). In this context the governments of southern 
Europe have primarily relied on demand-led growth strategies based on the expansion of 
domestic demand. These strategies, however, necessitate more active, expansionary 
macroeconomic policies that tend to raise rates of inflation. That is why in the years 
before joining the EMU, many of those governments used periodic devaluations of their 
exchange rates to offset the effects of inflation on trade balance6. In this respect, for the 
political economies of southern European countries EMU posed more serious challenges. 
Although joining the EMU lowered their transaction costs and the convergence criteria in 
the run-up to monetary union initially contributed to wage restraint, entry into the 
monetary union called into question the viability of the demand-led growth strategies, 
because they could no longer devalue to offset the accompanying inflation, which 
obviously had serious implications for their competitiveness. Yet, there has been a 
‘compensatory’ impact of EMU itself: namely, the confidence effects generated by the 
EMU quickly lowered the cost of capital in southern Europe; and, to invest the balance of 
payments surpluses building up in the north, the banks of northern Europe provided large 
flows of funds to southern Europe. This is the logic behind the provision of cheap credit 
that fuelled the expansion of domestic demand in southern Europe before the onset of 
the crisis (Hall, 2014, Paraskevopoulos 2012).  
 
Yet, obviously, the VoC approach takes a rather systemic view of the crisis and does not 
pay much attention to QoG indicators. Nonetheless, aspects of QoG, such as government 
effectiveness, corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality and so on, may point to crucial 
specificities of domestic institutional infrastructure which can account for possible 
variation in the intensity of and response to the crisis among south European countries.     
 
Hence, overall, the statist features of south European capitalism, along with aspects of low 
QoG, such as clientelism, patronage and corruption, appear to combine the “worst of both 
worlds” by acting as a drag on efficiency whilst doing little to deal with inequality. Yet, 
although these weaknesses of domestic institutional infrastructure may have crucially 
affected the adaptation and adjustment capacity and hence the response of south 
European countries to both Europeanisation-induced and MoU-induced external 
constraints (policy conditionality) during the current economic crisis, there is evidence of 
significant variation among south European countries with regard to capacity for 
institutional and policy adaptation (Blyth, 2003; Hall, 2010; Thelen, 2010; Hall and Thelen, 
2009; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Featherstone, 2008, 2011; 
Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001; Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008; 
Paraskevopoulos, 2004, 2005, 2006). In that respect, the key research hypotheses of this 
                                                 
6 Italy has been a case in point: the value of the Italian lira declined by about 25 percent within six years 
after the establishment of the European monetary system in 1979. 
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paper are formulated as follows. The VoC approach can crucially contribute to our 
understanding of the crisis of the Eurozone, by identifying variation in models of 
capitalism between European countries in general and north and southern Europe in 
particular. The QoG approach can account for possible variation between (southern 
European) countries with respect to institutional and governance performance at large. 
Finally, the interplay between QoG, social and institutional trust can contribute to 
capturing the interconnectedness between formal and informal institutions at the 
domestic level of governance, by identifying virtuous and/or vicious cycles within specific 
countries, thus accounting for variation in their reform and adaptation capacity. The 
following sections focus on identifying such variation between Greece and Portugal.     
 
 
3. Varieties of Europeanisation: Greece and Portugal before the 
onset of the crisis 
 
The Europeanisation process has long been viewed as a powerful tool driving institutional 
and policy reform in Southern Europe in general, and Greece and Portugal in particular, 
since its impact is linked to the post-authoritarian transition in these countries. Hence, it is 
also closely associated with the modernisation process7, while both processes are 
intrinsically linked to the problematique of governance in the EU, whereby the member 
states are facing the challenge to adapt their institutional and policy-making structures to 
a multi-layered policy-making environment (Marks 1993; Kohler-Koch 1996; Caporaso 
1996; Marks et. al. 1996; Piattoni, 2010). Given, however, that the notion of 
Europeanisation may take several meanings and refer to a wide variety of processes, that 
is historical, cultural, institutional (Olsen, 2002), in the context of public policy-making 
Europeanisation is primarily viewed as a process of institutional and policy adaptation as a 
response to EU policies, but also as the process by which national policies are transferred 
up to the European level and become the objective of collective decision-making 
(Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi, 2004). This dualism in the meaning of Europeanisation 
reflects the functional discrepancy between policy formulation and policy 
implementation, both dominated by the “principal-agent” model, which constitutes a 
powerful conceptual tool in modern public policy analysis (Hix and Hoyland, 2011). The 
former implies delegation of power and authority about policy design to the supranational 
                                                 
7 This is particularly true in the case of south European countries, where the notion of modernisation has 
not always been clearly defined, thus taking several connotations and meaning different things to different 
people. In particular, the ambiguity with regard to the content of modernization in public policy is related to 
its interpretation –often used in public policy analysis- as an one-way process of irreversible change leading 
towards the predominance of a specific paradigm in policy-making through the homogeneity of preferences 
and hence towards achieving overall convergence of policy styles in the long run. On the contrary, however, 
modernization may take several meanings/interpretations, i.e., modernization through market; through 
hierarchy/central state bureaucracy etc., and, therefore, there is always a need to clarify its 
meaning/content according to specific context(s) (Hood 1998:194-221). For in the context of Greece and 
probably other SEU countries it should primarily be interpreted as synonymous to institution building (see 
Paraskevopoulos, 2005).    
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level of governance. That is why it may be called “bottom-up” Europeanisation. 
Conversely, the latter refers to “top-down” Europeanisation and involves the key role of 
supranational institutions, and most notably the Commission, primarily through oversight 
in policy implementation along with the member states. Obviously, what matters for 
Southern Europe and EU periphery at large is the “top-down” Europeanisation, whereby 
member states face the challenge of adjustment to the EU policy environment. 
 
In that respect, there have been identified two broadly different mediating 
mechanisms/logics in the new institutionalist literature that can account for domestic 
institutional and policy change as a response to Europeanisation-induced conditionality: 
the rational choice and the historical/sociological (see inter alia Börzel and Risse 2000). 
The former, based on the ‘logic of consequentialism’, points to the role of formal 
institutions as crucial mediating factors that affect domestic actors’ (multiple veto 
players/points - Tsebelis, 2002) capacity for action and hence for policy and institutional 
change. This process has been conceptualised as ‘single-loop learning’ (Argyris and Schoen 
1978), whereby actors acquire new information, alter strategies but they pursue given, 
fixed interests. The latter focuses on the process of social learning as a fundamental 
mechanism of domestic change and identifies networks (either epistemic communities, or 
advocacy and/or issue-specific) and informal institutions, namely political and 
organisational cultures and social norms, as ‘thick’ mediating mechanisms that affect 
actors’ preferences through the ‘logic of appropriateness’, leading to the re-
conceptualisation of their interests and identities (Risse et. al. 2001; Checkel 2001). In 
other words, the process of social learning emphasises the role of experts in the policy 
process as policy-change entrepreneurs through their increased capacity for the diffusion 
of new knowledge (Haas, 1992; Hall, 1993) on the one hand, and informal conventions, 
namely social norms, as ‘glue providers’ for the re-stabilisation of the relations among 
actors involved in the learning process, on the other (Sabel, 1993, 1994). Obviously, this 
differentiation corresponds to the broader distinction [within the academic debate about 
how ‘paradigm change’ occurs in public policy] between interests, ideas and institutions as 
fundamental conceptual tools affecting change in public policy styles in general (Hood, 
1994).  
 
Yet, given the complexity of the multi-level governance structures within which the 
adaptation process takes place and the distinctive character of the policy-making 
structures at the EU level, the degree of ‘adaptational pressures’ facing domestic 
institutions and policy-making structures in order to comply with the European rules and 
regulations in public policy is especially high in unitary and centralised states8. Therefore, 
specific features of the pre-existing domestic institutional infrastructure constitute a 
crucial intervening variable between Europeanisation and domestic policy and 
                                                 
8 Although significant variation from one policy area to another is considered as the main feature of the EU 
policy-making structures, it has been argued that the EU institutional structure is more federal than unitary 
and its policy-making processes more pluralist than statist (Schmidt 1997). In that respect, it has been 
assumed, that the more centralised and unitary member states, such as Greece and Portugal, are likely to 
face stronger adaptational pressures than the decentralised and federal ones (ibid.). 
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institutional change that can account for the pace of Europeanisation process; hence the 
obvious link with the notions of VoC and QoG (Börzel and Risse 2000; Jeffery 2000; Risse 
et.al, 2001; Börzel 2001; Keating et.al., 2003; Paraskevopoulos, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2008, 
2012; Paraskevopoulos, et.al., 2006; Featherstone, 2008; Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 
2008).  
 
Nonetheless, from the perspective of external constraints, the intensity of policy 
conditionality is of crucial importance as well. Thus there is evidence to suggest that, given 
the fundamentally intergovernmental character of governance and policy-making 
structures of the EU in several policy areas, and most notably in the coordination of 
macroeconomic policy through the SGP, along with the introduction of rather soft 
approaches/mechanisms of policy coordination, such as the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC), the intensity of Europeanisation-induced policy conditionality may be viewed as 
rather low. Additionally, given that social learning and lesson-drawing are widely 
considered as more effective mechanisms of compliance in comparison with the tools of 
rationalist models of conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Rose, 1993, 
2002), the quality of pre-existing domestic institutional infrastructure matters for the pace 
of institutional and policy change. Therefore, arguably, Europeanisation is fundamentally 
associated with incremental, path-dependence dominated, rather than radical, critical 
juncture-like form of institutional and policy change at the domestic level of governance 
(see Hall, 2010; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; 
Paraskevopoulos, 2012). In that respect, the notion of Europeanisation is employed here 
as a conceptual tool of process tracing, from the perspective of the ‘systematic process 
analysis’ methodological approach (see Hall, 2003:373-404), in juxtaposition to the MoU-
induced, critical juncture-like form of policy conditionality. Yet, taking into account that 
the period of post-authoritarian transition -by definition a period of critical juncture for 
both countries- coincided with the beginning of the long Europeanisation process, to 
examine domestic responses to Europeanisation-induced policy conditionality, the paper 
concentrates on three crucial policy areas: macroeconomic adjustment; structural and 
labour market reforms; and cohesion policy. 
 
     
3.1 Macroeconomic adjustment 
 
Following the restoration of democracy, both countries came under severe pressure to 
adopt expansionary fiscal policies in order to come to terms with previously repressed 
social needs. This led to rapidly increasing social expenditure in the late 1970s and most of 
the 1980s in both countries9. This trend was particularly intense in Greece, due to intense 
                                                 
9 It is indicative that social expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) rose in the period from 1980 until the eve 
of the crisis from 12.2 per cent of GDP in Greece and 14.7 per cent in Portugal, in 1980, to 26 per cent and 
24.3 per cent respectively, in 2008. Yet, although these increases are remarkable, social spending per capita 
lagged behind increases in GDP per capita when compared to the corresponding EU-15 rates, indicating that 
the two countries underspent in social protection in terms of their wealth. This is a vindication of the 
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populist pressures throughout the 1980s, whereby welfare policies came to be viewed as 
a crucial instrument for socio-political integration within the clientelistic-particularistic 
institutional framework that characterised this period. Thus, Greece in the 1980s adopted 
expansionary fiscal policy accompanied by social policy/redistribution-related reforms, 
based primarily on borrowed money, which eventually led to rapid increase of public debt 
by the end of the decade. Yet, although policy cycles in the two countries may be seen as 
converging over time, there has been identified significant variation, i.e. expansionary 
policy during the first post-authoritarian period to be followed by Cavaco Silva’s market 
liberalisation reforms of the 1980s in Portugal vis-à-vis Greece’s continuation of the 
expansionary path in macroeconomic policy all over the 1980s (see Pagoulatos, 2004).   
 
In that respect, following the rather sluggish growth rates during the 1980s and early 
1990s, Greece achieved relatively high -almost spectacular- growth rates (ranging from 2-
4.5% per year) from late 1990s to 2007 (see figure 1). Although it could be argued that 
these growth rates merely reflect the benefits of joining the single currency, such as the 
reduction of transaction costs, this performance might partly at least be viewed as an 
outcome of the intensification of the modernisation and Europeanisation processes since 
the mid-1990s, put forward by what may be called ‘Simitis’ modernisation experiment’, 
namely the most serious in its inception and design and systematic in its implementation 
programme of institutional and policy reform that the country has ever experienced in the 
post-authoritarianism period. These growth rates, however, were fueled by cheap credit 
and went hand-in-hand with huge increase in public deficit and domestic demand 
between 1999 and 2009, very poor export performance, rapid deterioration of the 
country’s competitiveness and hence of the current account balance, thus vindicating the 
fundamental assumptions of the VoC approach about institutional and policy specificities 
of south European capitalism and MMEs at large10 (see Hall, 2012, pp.360-361). Thus the 
2008-09 global financial crisis merely exposed Greece’s vulnerabilities. Significant 
overspending and a sharp fall in government revenue pushed the general government 
deficit to 15.6% of GDP in 2009, while government debt reached 115% of GDP at the end 
of 2009 (see figures 2, 3). In sum, Greece entered the crisis period with a twin deficit 
(public and current account) of around 15% of GDP and a mounting debt burden. 
Moreover, the extent of the deterioration in the fiscal position was revealed with some 
delay due to serious deficiencies in Greece’s accounting and statistical systems. Delays in 
the implementation of corrective measures disconcerted financial markets, which began 
questioning Greece's fiscal sustainability, rating agencies downgraded the sovereign, and 
the yield on sovereign bonds and CDS spreads increased significantly (see CEC, 2011a,b,c). 
Following a further worsening of market conditions in the course of April 2010, in May 
                                                                                                                                                    
argument that welfare state expansion is not the main reason for the deterioration of public finances (see 
Petmesidou and Glatzer, 2015).  
10 It is indicative that Greece’s deficit of current account reached its pick (-14,2% of GDP in 2009) (see 
figure 4), while simultaneously, the country has been the real “champion” in increase of domestic demand 
from 1999 to 2009 (around 37%), followed by Spain and Ireland (with approx. 30% increase), countries that 
have also achieved high growth rates along with Greece in the decade before the onset of the crisis (see Hall, 
2012, pp.360-361).        
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2010, the Eurogroup agreed to provide bilateral loans pooled by the European 
Commission for a total amount of €80 billion, to be disbursed over the period May 2010-
June 2013. The financial assistance provided by euro-area member states was part of a 
joint package, with the IMF financing an additional €30 billion under a Stand-By 
Arrangement.      
 
Conversely, Portugal demonstrates significant differences in macroeconomic adjustment 
in the pre-crisis period. Actually, as it has been argued, Portugal has been living in a sort of 
“official austerity” ever since the Eurozone came into existence in 1999, associated with 
relatively low growth rates, which went hand-in-hand with low increase in domestic 
demand in the decade before the crisis (1999-2009) (see Hall, 2012; Blanchard, 2007; De 
Sousa et.al., 2014). Thus, although consecutive governments have been struggling to fulfill 
the SGP/convergence criteria, especially the public deficit and debt ones, budgetary 
discipline has been rather elusive, and hence excessive deficit procedures were initiated 
by the European Commission in this period (2002, 2005 and 2009) (see De Sousa et.al., 
2014). Actually, by 2009, the budget deficit had reached 9.4% of GDP (see figure 2), one of 
the highest in the Eurozone, the debt-to-GDP ratio was as high as 80% of GDP (see figure 
3), and the deficit of current account reached its pick (10,9% of GDP) in 2010 (see figure 
4), thus putting at risk the longer term sustainability of Portuguese public finances. Hence 
the Portuguese economy continued to stagnate and unemployment rose throughout that 
year. 
 
In addition to the fiscal problems, however, there was a banking debt dimension to the 
crisis as well. Indeed, the liberalisation of financial markets and the supervision failures of 
the Portuguese banking system by the Central Bank (Banco de Portugal) had enabled two 
Portuguese private banks, the Banco Português de Negócios (BPN) and Banco Privado 
Português (BPP), to accumulate losses for more than a decade. In the face of possible 
insolvency of the BPN and the BPP, and to avoid an alleged contamination of the whole 
banking sector, the government decided to nationalize the first and rescue the second 
through a state loan (see De Sousa et.al., 2014). Thus, by late 2009, Portugal suffered the 
first of a series of downgradings from the top three rating agencies. In December 2009, 
Standard and Poor’s lowered its long-term credit assessment of Portugal from stable to 
negative, voicing pessimism on the country’s capacity to reduce debt by controlling its 
public finances, addressing structural weaknesses, or improving the competitiveness of its 
economy. In the summer of 2010, Moody’s cut Portugal’s sovereign debt rating down 
from an Aa2 to A1. The inaction of the Portuguese government and the lack of clear 
political response at the European level led to a further downgrading of the sovereign 
bonds to the level of “junk” with severe implications for the country’s reputation in 
international financial markets. This also limited the access of Portuguese private banks to 
foreign credit, which meant that there was no capital available for companies and private 
investors. Thus the unemployment rate rose from 4% in 2000 to more than 12% in 2010, 
with the bulk of unemployed being highly educated (with a university degree) first time 
job seekers and young adults (see De Sousa et. al., 2014). Obviously, this problem may 
have highlighted some structural deficiencies of the Portuguese system of higher 
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education, such as the lack of employability of graduates of certain university courses, as 
well. Thus, the socialist Prime Minister Sócrates was forced to resign on March 23, 2011, 
following a no confidence vote by all five opposition parties in parliament and the 
rejection of a new plan for spending cuts and tax increases. On April 6, 2011, with interest 
rates on the sovereign bonds reaching new highs and with the country on the verge of 
bankruptcy, the resigning prime minister announced the government’s intention to ask 
the IMF and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) for a financial bailout of 80 
billion euros, corresponding to about 40% to 50% of GDP (see De Sousa et.al., 2014).  
 
Overall, unlike Greece, Portugal did not experience a ‘boom and bust’ trajectory in the 
2000s, given that excessive deficit procedures stemming from anemic growth led Portugal, 
on several occasions, to engage in cost containment and fiscal retrenchment well before 
the crisis. Hence the turn towards bailout austerity measures in Portugal was not as 
abrupt as in Greece. In that respect, macroeconomic adjustment in both countries was 
marked by varied growth rates, closely associated with the strength of domestic demand, 
but simultaneously accompanied by gradual loss of competitiveness especially during the 
2000s, thus vindicating the fundamental assumptions of the VoC approach. However, 
there has been significant variation in respect to the pace of adjustment: more abrupt in 
Greece, more gradual in Portugal, which entered the crisis in a much better shape in terms 
of fiscal adjustment. This is substantiated by the gap in public deficit and public debt 
between the two countries, especially in the period 2005-09. Yet, although this variation 
may be attributed to domestic factors, the character of Europeanisation, as a process 
fundamentally associated with incremental rather than radical change might be of crucial 
importance as well. In particular, taking into account the role of coordination of economic 
policies of the member states in achieving macroeconomic adjustment, relevant areas of 
concern may be the problematic functioning of SGP, primarily identified with the often 
soft-handed approach to policy implementation on the part of the Commission, on the 
one hand, and the intergovernmental character of the ECOFIN/Eurogroup, on the other 
(see inter alia McKay, 1999; Hall, 2013; Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2008).  
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
Figure  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF Country Report No 16/97 (Portugal: Third Post-Program Monitoring Report), p.20, March, 2016. 
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Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 3 
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3.2 Structural / labour market reforms  
 
The area of structural and labour market reforms -closely associated with the Single 
Market (SEM) and competition policy at large- has been one of the most crucial policy 
areas for the incremental adjustment of both countries to EU policy environment over the 
last twenty years or so. This is because reforms undertaken in this area are considered as 
complementary and hence crucial for other policies, such as macroeconomic adjustment, 
as well as, simultaneously, as touching upon sensitive issues for citizens, interest groups 
and the society as a whole. Thus, given the discretion enjoying member states within the 
framework of ‘variable geometry’, a key feature of EU governance, especially in Single 
Market-related issues (see Moravcsik, 1991, 1998), there is considerable variation in 
adaptation capacity across Eurozone countries.  
 
In this framework, although there is some truth in the claim that the GIIPS (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) countries wasted their first decade in the single currency in 
terms of implementing growth-oriented structural reforms, there is evidence based on the 
OECD index for Product Market Regulation (PMR), a good indicator of structural reform, 
that the improvement in the south was roughly equivalent to that in the north (see Hall, 
2012, 2014; Table 1). With respect to Greece and Portugal, in particular, both countries 
demonstrate substantial improvement in the period 1998-2008, albeit at a different 
pace/rhythm. Thus Greece, departing from a rather laggard position, improved its 
performance from 2.75 in 1998 to 2.21 in 2008, whereas Portugal’s performance has been 
spectacularly improved from 2.59 in 1998 to 1.69 in 2008 (Table 1). Hence, obviously, 
there is substantial variation/gap in structural adjustment performance between Greece 
and Portugal before the onset of the crisis. Moreover, it has to be stressed that the much 
better performance of Portugal in structural adjustment is reflected not only in key PMR 
indicators, such as barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment, but 
also in crucial Doing Business (DB) indicators, such as trading across borders, starting a 
business, resolving insolvency, protecting investors, and enforcing contracts (CEC, 
European Economy, 2014:19-20). Conversely, the problematic regulatory environment in 
pre-crisis Greece is reflected in key PMR indicators, such as state control, barriers to trade 
and investment, and barriers to entrepreneurship, but also in the areas of clearance rate, 
trading across borders, starting a business, getting credit and enforcing contracts (CEC, 
2014:19-20). Additionally, this discrepancy in structural adjustment between the two 
countries is further exacerbated by the ‘traditional’ weakness of Greece in crucial policy 
areas, the so called ‘remnants of protectionism’, such as transport (i.e. cabotage), 
competition/education (i.e. recognition of professional rights to non-state college 
graduates), and closed professions, such as pharmacists.     
 
The varied performance in structural adjustment goes hand-in-hand with variation 
between the two countries in the allocation of resources between low-productivity, non-
tradable activities, and high-productivity, tradable ones. In particular, while Portugal 
before the crisis was characterised by rather low rate, mostly jobless growth and low shift 
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of resources towards non-tradables, Greece -along with Spain- were characterized by 
expanding economies, and large shift of resources towards non-tradables. Thus in the 
years leading up to the crisis (between 2000 and 2007) the amount of labour resources 
absorbed by non-tradable activities increased by over 5 percentage points in Greece and 
Spain: from 38% to 44% in Greece, and from 47% to 52% in Spain (CEC, 2014:2). This shift 
reflects the declining competitiveness in both countries, in comparison with Portugal, but 
also the role of construction industry during the boom years, especially in Spain.  
 
With regard to labour market, both countries proceeded to the liberalisation of 
employment services and, if not successful in practice, at least in principle, embraced the 
idea of promoting a mix of passive and active policies. In particular, given the crucial role 
of labour market and social security/protection regimes within the reorientation of the 
main development goals and objectives of the economies, as formulated by the National 
Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRF) 2007-2013, toward greater competitiveness 
through innovation, these issues go beyond the boundaries of social policy and touch 
upon the main development challenges facing the countries and most importantly in 
achieving real competitiveness at the global level. Thus, reforms in this area signal an 
attempt to broaden the concept of social protection rights by weakening the link with 
regular employment. This is reflected in the expansion of social assistance and of 
integrated measures for social inclusion and work-life balance, particularly through EU 
funding (e.g. in the home help programme in Greece, which, since the late 1990s, has 
aimed to improve work-life balance and support female employment) (see Petmesidou 
and Glatzer, 2015). In that respect, the introduction of the minimum income scheme for 
social inclusion (Rendimento Social de Inserção-RMI) in Portugal, in 1996, should be 
considered as an important innovation in the realm of an integrated policy, as a well as a 
key difference with Greece, where the introduction of minimum income is still under 
preparation11 (Greek Parliament Budget Office-GPBO, October 2014, pp: 62-87; 
Petmesidou and Glatzer, 2015). Nevertheless, expenditure on active labour market 
policies remained low in both countries: it stood at a tiny 0.22 per cent of GDP in Greece 
and 0.59 per cent in Portugal in 2010/2011 (Petmesidou and Glatzer, 2015). Thus stringent 
rules on dismissals, high reservation wages, strict work demarcation, and varieties of 
dualism (e.g. through a large informal economy in the case of Greece and segmentation 
between a ‘fringe’ of weakly protected temporary contract workers and a “core” of 
protected permanent workers in Portugal), have persistently been major predicaments 
during the pre-crisis period in both countries12. Moreover, labour market reform has been 
                                                 
11 It should be reminded that, while initial steps for the introduction of a minimum income scheme in the 
form of regional pilot projects had already been undertaken by the previous ND-PASOK coalition 
government in 2014, after two years of Syriza governments in power its introduction is still under 
preparation. Actually the introduction of such a scheme, re-named as Social Solidarity Allowance (SSA) and 
based on means testing criteria, is planned for 2017.   
12 It has to be stressed though that in Greece, labour market reform was an integral part of Simitis 
governments’ reform agenda in the 1990s and the first decade of 2000s. Thus, along with PASOK’s priority 
and commitment to reduce unemployment by creating new jobs, the reform would focus on: increasing 
flexibility of working time; reducing employers’ national insurance contributions for newly recruited staff; 
restricting overtime; and relaxing limits on mass redundancies Yet, the reform eventually failed to 
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fundamentally influenced by deeply rooted institutional complementarities in both 
countries. For instance, the weaknesses of the welfare state, in terms of social insurance 
provisions, might make actors much more sensitive with regard to job security and 
therefore rather reluctant to accept reforms focusing on flexibility of the labour market 
(see Iversen and Stephens, 2008; Featherstone, 2008). 
 
In sum, although both countries substantially improved their performance with regard to 
structural reforms before the onset of the crisis, these reforms proved inadequate to help 
avoid the effects of the crisis. This is also consistent with the fundamental assumptions of 
the VoC approach. However, the variation between the two countries in the pace/rhythm 
of structural adjustment may point to the discrepancy in respect to specificities of 
domestic institutional and policy structures. Additionally, with regard to labour market 
reforms, despite the important similarities between the two countries (i.e. tendencies 
towards liberalisation/dualisation and dualism in policy implementation, generally poor 
performance in active labour market policy initiatives etc.), the prompt/timely 
introduction of the minimum income scheme (RMI) in Portugal may again point to crucial 
variation between the two countries in aspects of domestic institutional infrastructure at 
large. 
 
 
Table 1  
PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION (PMR) INDICATORS 1998 -2013 
(Index scale 0 to 6 from least to more restrictive) 
Country 1998 2003 2008 2013 
France 2.38 1.77 1.52 1.47 
Germany 2.23 1.80 1.41 1.29 
Netherlands 1.82 1.49 0.96 0.92 
Italy 2.36 1.80 1.49 1.26 
Ireland 1.86 1.58 1.35 1.45 
Greece 2.75 2.51 2.21 1.74 
Portugal 2.59 2.12 1.69 1.29 
Spain 2.39 1.79 1.59 1.44 
 
Source: Koske, I. et al. (2015) “The 2013 update of the OECD's database on product market regulation: Policy 
insights for OECD and non-OECD countries”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1200, Paris: 
OECD.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
materialize, following strong reactionary attitudes/resistance to change by the two main trade unions, the 
General Confederation of Workers (GSEE) and the Confederation of Public Sector Workers (ADEDY) (see 
Papadimitriou, 2005).  
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3.3 Cohesion policy  
 
In cohesion policy, and especially in the cases of Greece and Portugal, Europeanisation has 
long been linked to the crucial role of the policy as an indirect form of redistribution –
actually a substitute for the direct fiscal transfers which constitute common feature in 
federal states for tackling asymmetric shocks (see McKay, 1999; Krugman, 2011). 
Moreover, this function of cohesion policy is free of the risk of the so called “moral hazard 
effect” that characterises typical fiscal transfers (see Paraskevopoulos, 2001, 2005, 2008, 
2012). In doing so, however, cohesion policy affects and challenges well-established 
structures within the domestic systems of governance and plays an important role in 
administrative restructuring and devolution processes within the member states by 
enhancing institutional capacity at the sub national level. In particular, its impact on the 
regional and local policy-making arenas is supposed to be twofold: a direct one, by 
providing increased resources through redistribution and a new set of rules and 
procedures for the formulation and implementation of development policies; and an 
indirect one, by shaping intra-regional interactions and thus promoting local institutional 
capacity through the creation of intra, inter and trans-regional networks that support local 
development initiatives (Paraskevopoulos, 2001, 2005, 2008). In that respect, both 
countries have been experimenting with reluctant decentralisation and new modes of 
governance in Cohesion policy (Paraskevopoulos 2004; Paraskevopoulos et. al., 2006; 
Nanetti et. al., 2004).  
  
Yet, the key issues surrounding the implementation of cohesion policy over time in terms 
of adaptation and adjustment are the effective and efficient use of EU funds, the actual 
policy outcomes in achieving competitiveness and socio-economic cohesion, and policy 
innovation in the way in which policy is implemented. In that respect, with regard to the 
former, there seems to be a differentiation between Greece and Portugal in relation to 
the effect of EU structural policy interventions. In particular, structural policy 
interventions in the post-1994 period are much more physical infrastructure-oriented in 
Greece than primarily in Portugal and Ireland, where more emphasis is placed on the 
development of human capital (see Paraskevopoulos, 2005). Indeed, since the mid-1990s, 
the development of infrastructure came to be viewed as the first step of the 
Europeanisation of Greece and, simultaneously, as a prerequisite for the success of the 
modernisation process in other sectors of public policy. Thus, unlike other policy areas, 
where the outcomes of the Europeanisation and modernisation processes may be seen as 
ambiguous13, the development of physical infrastructure as a priority of the overall 
development policy since the mid-1990s came to be regarded as a success story for 
Greece. This trend, however, was underpinned by arguments about the generally bad 
condition of almost any sector of the country’s physical infrastructure, as well as by 
reference to what other comparable countries, notably Portugal and Ireland, had already 
                                                 
13 Such areas may include primarily regulation in public policy in general and especially in financial services 
and/or mass media, environmental policy, education, or areas of social policy. See in particular Featherstone 
and Kazamias (2001); Paraskevopoulos (2005). 
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done or were doing. In fact, there was a widespread feeling that the funds of the IMPs and 
the first CSF, having been dispersed on several small-scale, regional projects across the 
country, had much less impact than they would have had if they concentrated on large-
scale infrastructure projects (see Paraskevopoulos, 2005). However, this has had serious 
implications for policy outcomes in terms of improving competitiveness and achieving 
socio-economic cohesion. In particular, Portugal has substantially improved its 
competitiveness rate and therefore before the onset of the crisis it was in a much better 
position than Greece in the relevant index, primarily through increased human capital and 
research and development (R&D) spending (CEC, 2010a:69). Additionally, there is 
evidence to suggest that Portugal has been much more effective and efficient than Greece 
in social policy (e.g. it had a much better performance than Greece in population at risk of 
poverty after social transfers (CEC, 2010a:106).  
 
In sum, although the VoC approach would predict similarities between Greece and 
Portugal, as both countries belong to MMEs, there is evidence of significant variation in 
performance in all policy areas examined, which points to variation in the pace of 
Europeanisation process between the two countries. In particular, in macroeconomic 
adjustment, Portugal avoided the ‘boom and bust’ trajectory of Greece, which was 
marked by excessive deficit and mounting debt burden that led the country to default in 
2010. Conversely, Portugal, while suffering from anemic growth ever since joining the 
EMU, managed to get fiscal policy under control, thus entering the crisis in a much better 
fiscal shape in comparison with Greece. With regards to structural/labour market reforms, 
both countries achieved substantial improvement in the decade before the onset of the 
crisis. However, Portugal’s pace of improvement can be characterised as spectacular. A 
case in point is the prompt introduction of minimum income scheme (RMI) in Portugal in 
late 1990s, while in Greece it is still under preparation. Finally, in cohesion policy 
Portugal’s performance both in terms of use of physical infrastructure-oriented EU funds, 
as well as in terms of timely reorientation of policy towards human capital and R&D 
development has become obvious. Hence, there is evidence of substantial variation 
between the countries in the pace of adjustment and Europeanisation processes well 
before the onset of the crisis in late 2000s (see Figure 1 above).      
 
 
4. Variation in responses to MoU conditionality: Greece and 
Portugal in crisis 
 
As it is well known now, the eruption/breaking out of the crisis, initially in Greece and 
then across southern Europe in 2010-11, brought about new institutional mechanisms for 
provision of financial support at the supranational level of EU governance, such as the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and later the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), accompanied by a new institutional framework for policy conditionality, the 
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), to be monitored by the so called ‘troika’, 
comprising the EU Commission, the ECB and the IMF (see Featherstone, 2011). This 
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marked a fundamental shift in the intensity of external constraints/conditionality from 
incrementalism, the dominant logic of Europeanisation-induced conditionality, to a rather 
critical juncture-like and radical change-oriented logic of MoU-induced external policy 
conditionality, and its emphasis on the role of agency vis-à-vis preexisting institutional 
structures in the reform and adaptation processes (see Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). This 
is widely viewed primarily as an outcome of the IMF involvement in the oversight of the 
MoUs. In particular, although the IMF had embraced a so called “philosophy of 
parsimonious conditionality” over the last decade or so, following a strong criticism of the 
way it dealt with the Asian crisis (see Dreher, 2009; Boughton, 2003), the rescue deals for 
Greece and Portugal were characterized by extensive conditionality, dominated by the 
principles of moral hazard and ownership of the programmes. This extensive 
conditionality, however, goes hand-in-hand with the new economic governance of the 
Eurozone, based on the European Semester and introduced through the reformed SGP 
and Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) mechanisms of Six Pack, Two Pack and the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance (Fiscal Pact), and focusing on fiscal discipline 
through better fiscal policy coordination (see GPBO, 2014). As for policy substance, the 
dominant logic of MoUs has been that of the so called ordoliberalism14, an economic policy 
school of thought stressing the importance of stability and compliance to policy norms, 
namely for this case to the SGP, thus emphasising structural reforms as a way to achieve 
sustainability of public finances of the crisis-hit countries. It is indicative that a report 
commissioned by the European Parliament on identifying the main themes of Commission 
documents monitoring the structural adjustment plans in both countries shows that ‘fiscal 
consolidation’, ‘structural reform’ and ‘privatisation’ are the themes occurring with the 
highest frequency in the programme documents (mentioned, on average, 2.06 times per 
page in the case of Greece and 1.79 times in the case of Portugal), whereas the frequency 
with which ‘unemployment’, ‘poverty’, ‘inequality’ and ‘fairness’ are mentioned is 
negligible (See Figures 5 and 6, see also Sapir, et al. 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The term draws on the so called “Freiburg school of economics” and it is widely used with reference to 
the German economic policy during the crisis of the Eurozone (see inter alia Featherstone, 2011; Bulmer, 
2014).  
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Figure 5 
 
 
Source: IMF Country Report No 14/151 (Greece: fifth review under the extended arrangement/fund facility), 
p.5, June, 2014. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
Source: IMF Country Report No 16/97 (Portugal: Third Post-Program Monitoring Report), p.4, March, 2016 
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4.1 Macroeconomic adjustment 
 
The fundamental shift in the intensity of policy conditionality between the 
Europeanisation-induced and that introduced by the MoUs has had a clear impact on the 
intensity of macroeconomic adjustment in both countries, albeit at a very high price in 
terms of social costs. Thus, indeed, both countries experienced a radical/rapid adjustment 
over the period 2010-2016 primarily related to the reduction of the public and current 
account deficits, a key factor that had actually led them to default six-seven years ago. 
Yet, this adjustment was achieved mainly through MoU-induced austerity measures and 
therefore went hand-in-hand with continuous recession, especially in Greece, over the last 
six-seven years, with serious implications for the level of unemployment and public debt 
in both countries. However, the pace of adjustment was particularly intense/ tough in 
Greece and the social costs, in terms of the level of unemployment, poverty, inequality, 
material deprivation and so on, much higher than in Portugal. Moreover, the latter has 
successfully completed the programme in 2015 and it is not under the tutelage of the 
MoU conditionality and the “troika” anymore.               
 
In Greece, the first financial assistance programme (MoU) –signed in May 2010 and 
designed cover the government’s financing needs until 2012 and progressively less 
thereafter- was implemented by the PASOK government that had been elected in the 
autumn of 2009. This programme was focused on rapid improvement of the fiscal position 
of the country, and therefore it was fundamentally based on extensive, horizontal 
cutbacks in public sector expenditure, primarily salaries and pensions (see Petmesidou 
and Glatzer, 2015). This policy paid dividends and, indeed, led to sharp reduction of public 
and current account deficits in relatively short period of time from 15.4% of GDP in 2009 
to 10.3% in 2011 and from 15.1% in 2008 to 10% in 2011 respectively, at the expense of 
course -because of the recession- of the public debt which increased from 146% of GDP in 
2010 to 172% in 2011 (figures 1, 2, 3, 4).  
 
What needs to be stressed, though, is that partisanship, extreme polarisation and fierce 
resistance15 to change have been the dominant features of the political climate over that 
period in Greece, with the legislation surrounding the MoU and all relevant structural 
reforms package actually supported and passed through parliament exclusively by the 
majority of the governing party (PASOK) and without any political consensus with 
opposition parties. This political climate led to the resignation of PASOK government in 
autumn of 2011 and a new –actually the first- coalition government took over, supported 
by the two main political parties PASOK and New Democracy, and headed by a technocrat, 
professor L. Papademos, ex-governor of Bank of Greece, the Greek central bank. This 
rather short-lived ‘technocratic’ government –it lasted until June 2012- emphasised both 
                                                 
15 It needs to be stressed that extreme polarisation and resistance gave impetus to a massive mobilization 
at the societal level that gradually led to the creation of a mass movement, similar up to a point to Spanish 
“indignandos” (indignant-“aganktismenoi” in Greek), and a supposedly new (anti-MoU) cleavage in Greek 
society, which was heavily supported by a then marginal party of radical left, SYRIZA (see Aslanidis, 2015).  
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fiscal and structural adjustment, signed the second MoU programme of the magnitude of 
around Euro 175 billion in March 2012 to cover the post-2012 period and paved the way 
for the major haircut of public debt in human history through the cut of Private Sector 
Involvement (PSI) bonds that took place in November 2012 under Minister of Finance E. 
Venizelos. Following the election of June 2012 a new coalition government took over 
supported again by the two main political parties and headed by Prime Minister Samaras 
of New Democracy. This government substantially contributed to the relative stabilisation 
of the country by managing to reduce the public and current account deficits from 8.9% of 
GDP in 2012 to 5.9% in 201516 and from 3.8% in 2012 to 0.1% in 2015 respectively, and by 
completing the massive haircut of public debt through the PSI in November 2012. 
 
Nonetheless, because of the recession, public debt rose to 177.4% of GDP in 2015 (see 
Figures 2, 3, 4), while unemployment rose from 12.7% in 2010 to 27.5% in 2013, but 
reduced to 24.9% in 2015 (see Eurostat data). Following a snap election in January 2015, 
caused by the refusal of SYRIZA and other minor populist opposition parties to agree on a 
consensual election of President of the Republic by the parliament, a new coalition 
government consisting of SYRIZA and a small right wing populist -with some resemblance 
to UKIP- party, the ‘Independent Greeks–ANEL’, came to power. After the disastrous first 
six months of 2015 that led to the imposition of capital controls, a new –third- MoU 
programme was agreed in summer 2015 at the magnitude of around Euro 85 billion, 
associated, however, with continuation of austerity, very high increase of direct and 
indirect taxation and recession, thus leading the country to a stagnation with serious long-
term implications for the economy and the society as a whole. Main features of this 
situation are the piling of debt at 179% of GDP and the elimination of both public and 
current account deficits in 2016, although the latter is primarily due to the decline of 
imports, rather than the dynamism of exports, given the very low performance of Greece 
in exports, especially after excluding oil and tourism (see Figures 2, 3, 4, 5).                    
 
Notwithstanding the macroeconomic adjustment and regardless of the levels of 
effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of MoU programmes, there have been 
introduced crucial for Greece institutional innovations as well. These include the creation 
of independent –from political control- authorities dealing with/having the oversight of 
sustainability of public finances at the domestic level of governance, such the National 
Statistical Service (ELSTAT), the Fiscal Council and the independent Public Revenue 
Authority/Service. Finally, an independent Greek Parliament Budget Office (GPBO) has 
been created in 2013. 
 
Portugal followed a fundamentally different path in response to MoU conditionality in 
comparison with Greece. Following a series of negotiations between the EU Commission, 
the ECB and the IMF, that is the “troika”, on the one hand, and the government, the two 
opposition parties, but also various civil society organisations, on the other, a programme 
                                                 
16 It has to be reminded, however, that since 2014 the country had started to have primary budget 
surpluses and to enjoy small, though not negligible, growth rates (see Figure 1).    
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document was produced with the agreed measures to be implemented between 2011 and 
2013. The programme was concentrated on three main areas: fiscal consolidation, the 
solidity of the Portuguese banking system, and a set of structural reforms focusing on the 
improvement of Portugal’s potential to return to economic growth. The latter was aimed 
at enabling the country to overcome the lack of competitiveness of the previous decade 
(see De Sousa et.al., 2014). Indeed, the first decade of the 21st century, the so called ‘lost 
decade’, was revealing in relation to the lack of competitiveness of the Portuguese 
economy. Thus real GDP growth was very low (close to 1%) from 2000 to 2012 (see figure 
1), the unemployment rate rose from 5% to 17%, the central government deficit was 3.2% 
of GDP in 2000 and reached 11.2% in 2010, and government debt rose inexorably from 
50% in 2000 to 96% of GDP in 2010 (see Figures 2,3). Additionally, Portugal had lost its 
appeal to foreign investors: in the Global Competitiveness Index, the country dropped, 
between 2000 and 2011, from 28th place worldwide to 46th, two positions above Italy 
and one position below Slovenia (see De Sousa et.al., 2014). Finally, while in the early 
1990s the current account deficit was 2%  to 3% of GDP, in 2009 it had reached 10% of 
GDP (see figure 4). Yet, the outcome of the adjustment process culminated in the 
reduction of unemployment to 11.2% in 2016, and also to the elimination of government 
deficit and a slightly positive (surplus) of the current account in 2016, demonstrating the 
exports dynamism of Portugal after the crisis (see Figures 2, 4, 6).   
 
Nonetheless, in a similar vein to Greece, but at lower scale of intensity, the poor scoring in 
the economy, in terms of record-level unemployment (in particular of highly qualified 
young job seekers), rising taxation and economic recession, led to growing discontent and 
anti-MoU demonstrations from disheartened citizens. Indeed, the social costs of economic 
adjustment of this magnitude have been profound. Among the most emblematic 
measures in this context were the reduction of nominal civil servant wages between 3.5 
and 10% for salaries above EUR 1.500 per month, with projected savings of 5% in the 
overall wage bill and a freezing of all public pensions and wages under EUR 1.500. These 
measures represented a large real income loss for active civil servants (between 4.9 and 
11.4%) and a small loss for retirees (Graça João Carlos, et.al., 2011; see also Petmesidou 
and Glatzer, 2015). Other measures included the unprecedented cut in public investment 
and re-evaluation of all major PPP projects, the most emblematic being the high speed 
train connection between Lisboa and Madrid (see Graça João Carlos, et.al., 2011). 
 
Finally, it needs to be stressed that in contrast with Greece, and despite the reactionary 
attitudes, the Portuguese voters conceded 78% of their votes to the parties that signed 
the agreement. Additionally, the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies and the 
corresponding Technical Memorandum of Understanding signed by the representatives of 
the troika and the center-left government of the socialist party (Partido Socialista) with 
the support of the main opposition parties (Partido Social Democrata and Centro 
Democrático Social) on the right of political spectrum, that a few days later would come to 
win the general elections and in fact implement the programme in coalition.  
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Overall, indeed, the shift from incrementalism, the logic of Europeanisation-induced 
conditionality, to the MoU-radical change-oriented logic of policy conditionality led to a 
rather rapid macroeconomic adjustment in both countries at a high price in terms of social 
costs. Yet, there is again substantial variation in the pace and costs of this adjustment 
between Greece and Portugal. In particular, given that Portugal entered the crisis in 
comparatively better shape than Greece and its more consensual policy environment, but 
also because probably of the better quality of its domestic institutional infrastructure, it 
completed the programme promptly in 2015. Conversely, Greece, characterised by a more 
confrontational policy environment, has been in recession since 2009 and is currently in 
stagnation under the third MoU programme in a row. This performance gap however 
becomes more evident -and probably closely associated with the quality of domestic 
institutional infrastructure- in the social costs of adjustment. In that respect, in terms of 
risk-of-poverty, Greece has the highest proportion of population (35.7% in 2015) at risk of 
social exclusion among the EU 28 member states, compared to 27.7% in 2010. 
Additionally, the proportion of absolute poverty (that is the percentage of population with 
income at the level of deprivation) has risen from 18.9% in 2009 to 48% in 2014 (see 
GPBO, 2017). Conversely, Portugal’s proportion of population at risk of poverty has risen 
from 25.3% in 2010 to 26.6% in 2015, but dropped to 25.1% in 2016 (see Eurostat; EU-
SILC). With regard to income inequality measured on the basis of GINI coefficient, in 
Greece it has been risen from 32.9 in 2010 to 34.2 in 2015, whereas in Portugal it has been 
dropped from 34.2 in 2012 to 33.9 in 2015. Finally, with regard to material deprivation, in 
Greece it has almost doubled in the period 2010-2015 from 11.6% to 22.2% respectively, 
whereas in Portugal it has been reduced from 25.5% in 2013, to 21.6% in 2015, and 19.5% 
in 2016 (see EU-SILC).        
 
 
4.2 Structural / labour market reforms 
 
Although indicators measuring the overall regulatory environment show that Greece and 
Portugal led the reform effort according to the OECD PMR indicator between 2008 and 
2013, the performance in structural reforms, as a response to MoU conditionality, 
constitutes a crucial area better reflecting and demonstrating the discrepancy/variation 
between the two countries in terms of adaptation capacity. In that respect, both countries 
demonstrate substantial improvement in the period 2008-2013, albeit at a different 
pace/rhythm. Thus Greece, departing from its laggard position before the onset of the 
crisis, improved its performance from 2.21 in 2008 to 1.74 in 2013, whereas Portugal 
spectacularly improved its performance from 1.69 in 2008 to 1.29 in 2013 (see Table 1). 
Yet, even after this substantial improvement, Greece still belongs to the laggards in 
structural reforms among the EU member states, whereas Portugal is among the best 
performers. Obviously, undoubtedly, this variation/gap in structural adjustment between 
the two countries reflects the situation before the onset of the crisis. In that respect, the 
much better performance of Portugal in structural adjustment in the period 2008-13 is 
reflected not only in key PMR indicators, but also in almost all crucial Doing Business (DB) 
indicators, such as trading across borders, starting a business, resolving insolvency, 
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protecting investors, enforcing contracts, dealing with construction permits and business 
regulation. Conversely, the problematic regulatory environment and adaptation capacity 
of Greece is reflected in the fact that the only Doing Business (DB) indicators in which the 
country has demonstrated substantial improvement are dealing with construction permits 
and starting a business (CEC, 2014:19-20).  
 
Additionally, while the introduction of an electronic registry to simplify the creation of 
new businesses and the introduction of a new form of limited liability corporation that has 
no capital requirement may have helped Greece rise 110 places to 36th out of 189 in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Report, the biggest improvement of any country between 
July 2012 and June 2013 (CEC, 2014), in 2017 the country has been dropped to the 61st 
place; conversely, Portugal is at 25th place in 2017 and improving (see World Bank, 2017). 
As far as the EU Services Directive is concerned, reforms implemented by mid-2013 are 
estimated to boost labour productivity in the sectors affected by the Directive by around 
4.3% in Portugal and almost 9% in Greece. Given that the directive covers an average of 
40% of GDP in the four south European countries, the full economy-wide effects are 
expected to be considerable (CEC, 2014). 
 
In accordance with the pre-crisis period, variation between the two countries is evident in 
the allocation of resources between non-tradable activities, and high-productivity, 
tradable ones as well. In the 2010-13 period there has been observed a changing tendency 
in Spain, Portugal and Greece, as the reallocation towards non-tradables stopped and 
started to reverse. Yet, while in Spain and Portugal this change has been driven by a big 
contraction of value added in the non-tradable sector and the continuation of the 
expansion of the tradable sector, in the case of Greece, both sectors are contracting 
during the adjustment period. Thus in Greece there is no clear pattern in terms of 
reallocation of resources as both tradable and non-tradable sectors are declining (see CEC, 
2014).   
 
As for the labour market reforms, successive legislation under the MoUs significantly 
changed the rules governing industrial relations in Greece. Public sector reforms led to 
wage reductions, a recruitment freeze and dismissals, while in the private sector, 
legislation facilitated flexible and precarious employment, redundancies and reformed the 
collective bargaining system. Thus, in February 2012, the General Collective Agreement 
among social partners was abolished by law, a reduction of the minimum wage (to 580 
euros, gross) was imposed and the unemployment benefit was reduced to 360 Euros. 
These reforms actually favored and facilitated labour contracts at the enterprise level and 
the individualisation of employment conditions accompanied by reduced remuneration, 
thus leading indirectly to an increase of uninsured labour (see Petmesidou and Glatzer, 
2015). With regard to minimum wage, legislation provided that it will be set by law, thus 
undermining the role of autonomous collective negotiations. However, a requirement of 
prior consultation by the Employment Ministry with the social partners before legislating 
on minimum wage was introduced, which cannot recompense for the trade unions’ right 
to free collective bargaining. Regulations also imposed a pay freeze, suspended the 
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application of industry-wide and occupational agreements for all employees in a sector or 
occupation, and restricted the ability of employees to seek arbitration. By facilitating the 
drawing up of employment agreements at the business level, even in very small 
enterprises and by informal associations of workers, legislation under the MoU effectively 
dismantled the collective regulation of working conditions. In response to the trade 
unions’ appeal filed in 2012, the Council of State recently issued a ruling that found the 
restrictions in arbitration unconstitutional, but rejected the appeal against the entire 
spectrum of reforms seriously limiting labour rights. Finally, an extra benefit of 200 Euros 
for the long-term unemployed was introduced (for up to 12 months), although due to the 
highly restrictive eligibility criteria, only 1.5 per cent of the registered long-term 
unemployed currently receive it (see Petmesidou and Glatzer, 2015). 
 
In Portugal, labour market reform under the MoU purportedly aimed to address labour 
market dualism. However there is evidence to suggest that it has been expanding. Labour 
costs have been significantly reduced and dismissals have been made easier by reducing 
severance payments and widening the criteria for fair dismissal. The regulation of fixed-
term contracts was redesigned to allow for longer terms and a greater number of 
extensions to a maximum of 18 months. Overtime pay was reduced, four public holidays 
were abolished, paid holiday entitlements were reduced, and the minimum wage was 
frozen at 485 euros monthly (from January 2011). Collective bargaining agreements were 
altered to significantly reduce their application to non-unionized workers. Given Portugal’s 
low union membership (20 per cent), this has had a significant impact. According to the 
Portuguese Ministry of Employment, from 2008 to 2012, the number of private sector 
workers covered by collective agreements dropped sharply from about 1.9 million to 
327,600 (Petmesidou and Glatzer, 2015). In order to increase unemployment benefit 
coverage in Portugal from a very low level, the necessary contribution period to access 
benefits was lowered from 15 to 12 months. However the maximum duration of benefits 
was cut by almost half, from 30 to 18 months, but unemployment benefits were extended 
to some categories of self-employed workers in both Greece and Portugal (Petmesidou 
and Glatzer, 2015). 
 
Thus overall, labour market reforms in both countries have been dealing with the MoUs 
tendency towards tackling dualism by enhancing deregulation of labour market through 
institutional displacement. In that respect, there are important similarities between the 
two countries, in terms of increasing phenomena of black/informal labour market thus 
actually intensifying dualism. In structural reforms there seems to be a clear variation/gap 
in adaptation performance between Greece and Portugal. This has become evident in the 
PMR and DB indicators, with Greece still being a clear laggard and Portugal belonging to 
the group of best performing countries of the EU.        
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4.3 Cohesion policy 
 
With regard to policy innovation in the implementation phase of Cohesion policy, 
although Greece has arguably been experimenting with crucial reforms in terms of 
decentralisation and devolution, such as the so called ‘Kapodistrias’ and ‘Kallikratis’ plans, 
both countries are facing almost the same issues with regard to policy formulation and 
implementation during the programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020, even though 
the success stories for Greece are almost exclusively identified with improvement in 
physical infrastructure. Thus, according to the responses of institutional actors at the 
national and regional levels, entrepreneurship and competitiveness through innovation 
and sustainability, as well as fostering social inclusion through employment and non-
discrimination are the main issues dominating cohesion policy in the current programming 
periods, that is in formulating the NSRFs17. Yet, in the Greek case, the emphasis on 
sustainability and competitiveness, not least as part of the Gothenburg Strategy, following 
the Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion and taking into account Greece’s 
weakness in relation to specific indicators of the Lisbon agenda, such as those of the 
‘knowledge economy’18, the main features of the NSRF for Greece are reflected primarily 
on the reorientation of policy priorities in the Sectoral Operational Programmes (SOPs). 
Conversely, at the regional level, the top-down structure of cohesion policy interventions 
in the current programming period, along with creeping centralisation in policy 
implementation are identified as the main issues dominating policy. Additionally, given 
the delays in the implementation of policy, especially in Greece (programmes’ absorption 
rates vary between 15-20% maximum), it has been difficult to identify clear-cut 
successes/success stories and/or failures. However, the shift in focus from infrastructure 
to ERDF actions in favour of entrepreneurship and competitiveness is identified as a 
success in Greece. In that respect, institutional respondents have emphasized 
policy/programme implementation rather than policy design/formulation as possible 
explanatory variable for success or failure. Thus they underlined the importance of 
improved levels of coordination among actors participating in the implementation of 
policy/programmes. In the same vein, they have emphasized important institutional 
weaknesses at the level of central administration, particularly in Greece, vis-a-vis 
increased EU programme requirements with regard to institutional, that is administrative 
capacity at the domestic level of governance.   
 
                                                 
17 These are findings of interviews which were part of fieldwork research conducted in the framework for a 
DG-Regio research project.    
18 It should be reminded that Greece lags far behind in relation to most of Lisbon agenda targets, such as 
job creation and employment rate, particularly for women and older workers, risk-of-poverty rate after 
social transfers, long-term unemployment rate, greenhouse gas emissions and energy intensity of the 
economy. Yet, the most striking discrepancy, closely linked to the main goal of achieving a “knowledge 
economy” is the case of gross domestic expenditure on R&D, whose current level is 0.57% of GDP in 2006 
with the EU27 rate at 1.84% and the EU target for 2010 at 3%. It is just indicative for Greece’s position that 
the R&D expenditure target of 1.5% of GDP has been postponed from 2010 to 2015 (see Paraskevopoulos, 
2008).          
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With regard to the impact of and response to the economic crisis, there have been efforts, 
particularly in Greece, towards acceleration of pace in policy/NSRF implementation at 
both the national and regional levels. This has resulted in increased emphasis on the 
management of the funds with subsequent pressures with regard to the level of 
absorption in almost all policy areas/programmes. 
 
Overall, in Greece there seems to be a positive view about cohesion policy interventions 
related to infrastructure improvement measures and the improvement of the quality of 
ICT networks. Conversely, there is a negative assessment of efficiency of policy 
interventions focusing on family support and connecting R&D activities of the research 
community and private firms. Additionally, there seems to be a negative view about the 
efficiency of cohesion policy interventions in crucial areas of social policy, such as job 
placement of women and young people, job placement of displaced workers and the 
elderly and handicapped, and the improvement of female entrepreneurship, in Greece.  
 
In sum, variation in cohesion policy implementation between Greece and Portugal 
involves primarily the existing gap in effectiveness and efficiency in the use of EU funds 
with Portugal having achieved considerable gains in manufacturing productivity, and 
hence competitiveness, through a strong increase in its capital stocks of infrastructure, 
human resources and particularly R&D, while Greece still emphasising investment in 
physical infrastructure (see CEC, 2010a). Additionally, Portugal seems to be much more 
efficient in the use of ESF funds in crucial areas of social policy, such as tackling risk of 
poverty.    
 
 
5. Accounting for variation: VoC, QoG or Trust?  
 
There is a burgeoning literature on post-authoritarian transition in Greece and Portugal, 
and southern Europe at large, which deals with the democratisation and Europeanisation 
processes in these countries. Given that by definition the transition period from 
authoritarian regimes constitutes a period of critical juncture characterized by more or 
less extensive institution building that marks the initiation of a longer period of 
incremental institutional and policy change dominated by the logic of path dependence, 
this literature concentrates on identifying similarities and differences in the 
democratisation and Europeanisation processes among south European countries, by 
focusing on the quality of formal and informal institutional infrastructure. For obvious 
reasons, the emphasis is on the so called third wave –of democratisation- countries, 
notably Greece, Portugal and Spain. In that respect, this literature, drawing primarily, if 
not exclusively, on new institutionalist approaches to institutional change, emphasizes 
initially the historical characteristics, such as the typology of dictatorial regimes and the 
specificities of the transition or regime change period itself. Accordingly, it tries to identify 
crucial variables that can account for similarities or variations in the evolution of 
democratisation and/or Europeanisation processes in these countries. Thus particular 
emphasis is placed on crucial aspects of the political and/or party systems (Morlino 1998), 
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on specificities of the organisation of the socio-economic interests (Schmitter 1995), on 
important cultural aspects (Diamandouros, 1994; Diamandouros and Gunther, 2001), 
and/or on crucial structural variables, such as the type of bureaucracy and state-society 
relations, namely different forms of clientelism and corruption (Lyrintzis, 1984; Morlino, 
1995; Sotiropoulos, 2004).   
 
With regard to the comparative analysis of the cases of Greece and Portugal, existing 
literature has identified important similarities but also crucial differences (variation) 
between the two countries in respect to the adaptation and Europeanisation processes. 
This variation became more emphatic during the post-2010 crisis period. Thus, although 
the kicking off of the democratisation and Europeanisation processes in mid-1970s 
demonstrates important similarities between the two countries, there have been 
identified crucial differences as well. In particular, while the first post-authoritarianism 
period (1974-80) in Greece -under New Democracy/Constantine Karamanlis governments- 
has been characterized by a rather smooth and successful, in terms of institution-building, 
transition to democracy, democratisation in Portugal has been marked by political 
instability due to what has been called “revolutionary mobilisation” (Petmesidou and 
Glatzer, 2015:160; see also Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle, 1995). Yet, although the 
emergence and coming to power of the first PASOK government in 1981, which coincided 
with Greece’s accession to the EC/EU, brought about significant reforms in terms of the 
democratisation of the state and the institutionalisation of basic human rights, the main 
features of its first period in office (1981-89) in terms of institution building, have been 
rather poor (see Paraskevopoulos, 2012; Pappas, 2014). More specifically, the 
institutionalisation of political clientelism and the emergence and expansion of 
bureaucratic clientelism and populism (Lyrintzis, 1984, 2005; Sotiropoulos, 1996, 2004; 
Pappas, 2014) went hand-in-hand with the predominance of political parties in almost any 
aspect of social and economic life, the so called ‘partitocracy’ (Mouzelis, 2005). These 
pathologies gave impetus to a confrontational policy environment, marked by clientelistic-
particularistic exchanges by rent-seeking interest groups, thus undermining expertise 
(think tanks, policy communities) and civil society actors’ involvement in policy-making 
and hence social dialogue that would facilitate the process of negotiated policy reform 
(Paraskevopoulos, 2004, 2005, 2012; Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008; Pelagidis and 
Mitsopoulos, 2011; Monastiriotis and Antoniades, 2009). Therefore almost all crucial 
policy areas, including fiscal consolidation, industrial relations, pension and competition 
policies, remained highly politicized, fragmented and conflictual. Obviously, this policy 
environment in conjunction with the poor quality of public administration, in terms of 
impartiality, professionalism and efficiency (Spanou, 1996), and especially the weaknesses 
at the level of core executive (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2015), has constituted an 
impediment to the capacity for policy reform and adaptation19. This comes in sharp 
                                                 
19 It needs to be stressed that these weaknesses of the domestic institutional infrastructure remained 
almost intact and “survived” the modernization experiments undertaken during the 1990s, initially, and 
reluctantly, by the New Democracy government under C. Mitsotakis (1990-93) and then by the PASOK 
governments of C. Simitis (1996-2004), even though the latter stands out as a paradigmatic case of rather 
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contrast to Portugal, where the prospect of accession to the EU and later the challenge of 
joining the EMU brought about a shift in policy-making towards a more ‘consensual’ policy 
environment that underpinned interconnected reforms in labour market, social security 
and welfare policies through negotiated social pacts (Petmesidou and Glatzer, 2015). 
Additionally, the ways in which political parties related to their social base differed 
substantially between the two countries. In Greece, electoral support was maintained 
primarily through clientelistic and patronage networks that extended to trade unions, 
while in Portugal, a comparatively stronger tradition of compromise and more effective 
and efficient institutional structures governing the political and electoral cycle have 
contributed to rather resilient political structures (Petmesidou and Glatzer, 2015). In that 
respect, it is indicative that, as mentioned above, in Portugal the outgoing Socialist Party 
(PS) signed the bail-out deal with the support of the incoming centre-right Social 
Democratic Party (PSD) which undertook its implementation without strong opposition, 
whereas in Greece, PASOK bore initially the blame for dragging the country to the MoU 
and to the supervision by the troika that led the party to disrepute and out of power in 
2011, as well as to its nadir of political support in the January 2015 elections amidst 
extensive populist mobilisation along the lines of anti-austerity and anti-MoU cleavages 
(see Petmesidou and Glatzer, 2015). Hence, overall, despite important similarities 
between the two countries, there are crucial differences dominating their post-
authoritarian period across several policy areas that can be justified by the presence of 
variation in institutional and policy-making structures.  
 
This paper, suggests that the notions of VoC, QoG and social and institutional trust can 
actually complement the existing literature by capturing the interplay between formal and 
crucial informal institutional structures, such as government effectiveness and efficiency, 
regulatory quality, political stability and populism, voice and accountability, rule of law 
and control of corruption. Thus, they can account for similarities and/or variation in the 
reform and adaptation processes between the two countries. Yet, given that both 
countries belong to the so called MMEs, but also demonstrate important similarities in 
almost all the relevant institutional structures, such as the system of industrial relations, 
corporate governance, vocational training, pensions system, labour market and so on, 
with a possible exception of the exports sector where Portugal has been performing 
spectacularly well over the last three to four years following the completion of the MoU, 
the concept of VoC is considered as a constant and hence it cannot be employed as an 
explanatory variable for the variation between the two countries. Hence, to account for 
the existing variation in the reform and adaptation capacity between the two countries we 
turn to the QoG and trust variables. These variables may play a crucial role in facilitating 
or inhibiting the adaptation and adjustment processes of the domestic institutional and 
policy-making structures by shaping interactions among actors within institutional and/or 
policy networks, such as advocacy coalitions and/or issue networks (see inter alia Sabatier 
& Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Ladi, 2005; Paraskevopoulos, 2001, 2004, 2005).  
                                                                                                                                                    
successful modernization reforms, especially at the level of core executive and public administration at large 
(see Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2015).    
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Figure 7 
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Figure 9 
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Figure 11 
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Figure 13 
 
 
 
              Source: World Bank Governance Indicators. 
 
 
5.1 Greece, the typical laggard: low quality of government and low trust  
 
Greece may be characterized as a typical laggard in terms of institutional, administrative 
and reform capacity at large, demonstrating very low level of QoG, accompanied by low 
level of social and institutional trust. In particular, in all measures/indicators of QoG, 
namely government effectiveness, regulatory quality, political stability, voice and 
accountability, rule of law and control of corruption, the country appears to be at a clear 
laggard position among southern European countries and EU periphery at large, while it 
seems that its overall performance has been seriously deteriorated during the crisis years 
(see figures 7-13). Additionally, its performance in the crucial for reform and adaptation 
capacity indicators, namely government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and 
political stability, has been further deteriorated since 201520, and is well below EU average 
in the QoG index. Hence, from macro-analytical perspective, according to a QoG study for 
the EU Commission, Greece’s position vis-à-vis the other EU member states is depicted 
within a group/cluster of primarily Balkan and Eastern European countries with a few 
                                                 
20 It is worth stressing that this finding is also vindicated by the latest (2016) Sustainable Governance 
Indicators (SGI) of the Bertelsmann Stiftung, whereby Greece’s position as a laggard country of the EU in 
terms of quality of government, has been further deteriorated since 2014 (after the coming to power of the 
SYRIZA-Independent Greeks-ANEL populist government) (see Bertelsmann Foundation, 2016).   
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exceptions of Southern Europe, and particularly Italy21. In that respect, Greece belongs to 
the so called group three of low performing countries, along with Italy, Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania (see CEC, 2010c). With 
regard to social and institutional trust, Greece demonstrates very low level of trust on 
both fronts: namely social or generalized trust and trust in both political and law and 
order institutions (such as the national parliament, political parties, legal system, police, 
and so on), and with institutional trust seriously declining during the period of crisis (see 
figures 14,15,16). This has serious implications for the low level of cooperative culture 
which seems to be a dominant feature of Greece’s institutional infrastructure at large, 
closely associated with statism, namely the combination of centralized and simultaneously 
weak administrative structure.  
 
Overall, institutional weakness associated with low level of QoG, social and institutional 
trust, and closely linked with normative and instrumental beliefs on the part of the 
citizens and/or interest groups about the real outcomes of the reforms, has had serious 
implications for the reform process in such crucial and complicated policy areas as the 
sustainability of public finances and/or structural and labour market reforms. More 
specifically, low level of QoG and social and institutional trust has contributed to weak 
capacity for coalition building around/supporting the reforms on the basis of increased 
ambiguity about the possible redistributive effects of the reforms in the future. On the 
other hand, the weakness in relation to expertise involvement, in the form of independent 
think tanks, in the reform process in these complicated policy areas and the Lisbon agenda 
at large22 contributed to rather poor sources for the formation of people’s instrumental 
beliefs about the possible outcome and/or inevitability of these reforms (see 
Paraskevopoulos, 2012). Thus low levels of QoG and trust are identified as key variables 
negatively affecting domestic reform capacity and hence the prompt implementation of 
MoU-induced reforms, but also undermining the ownership of the programme and thus 
strengthening the moral hazard argumentation and distrust in domestic governance 
structures in Greece on the part of the “troika” and especially the IMF.      
 
Finally, the case of Greece seems to vindicate the so called institutionalist theory of trust, 
which emphasizes the role of formal state institutions and QoG at large, as a crucial 
variable indirectly affecting the level of social trust through citizens’ inferences and 
perceptions about the quality of formal and informal institutional infrastructure at large 
and their stickiness (see Rothstein, 2005; 2012; Uslaner, 2008; Paraskevopoulos, 2012).      
 
                                                 
21 This is another vindication of the so called East-West divide in southern Europe, between Greece and 
Italy on the one hand and Portugal and Spain on the other, in terms of quality of government and reform 
and adaptation capacity at large (see inter alia Paraskevopoulos, 2004, 2005, 2006).   
22 It has to be reminded that think tanks operating in the policy areas affected by the Single Market include 
the Institute for Economic and Industrial Research (IOBE), a supposed to be semi-independent think tank 
reflecting views of and partly financed by the Confederation of Greek Industry (SEV) and the Institute of 
Labour of the General Confederation of Workers (GSEE), the main umbrella organisation of private sector 
workers in Greece.      
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Figure 14 
 
 
Source: CEC (2010b) Measuring the Quality of Government and Subnational Variation, Report for the 
European Commission Directorate-General Regional Policy. 
 
 
Figure 15 
Social trust in southern Europe during the crisis 
 
 
 
Source: European Social Survey (ESS), various years (based on countries’ participation in ESS rounds). 
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Figure 16 
Institutional trust in southern Europe during the crisis23 
 
 
 
Source: European Social Survey (ESS), various years (based on countries’ participation in ESS rounds). 
 
 
5.2 Portugal, the outsider: high quality of government and low trust  
 
Portugal, on the other hand, constitutes an outsider/deviator, demonstrating medium to 
high level of QoG, but also very low levels of social and institutional trust. In particular, in 
all measures of QoG, namely government effectiveness, regulatory quality, political 
stability, voice and accountability, rule of law and control of corruption, Portugal appears 
to be at a medium to high position among southern European countries and EU periphery 
at large, while it seems that its overall performance has been almost stable/unaffected 
by/during the crisis years (see figures 7-13). Additionally, what needs to be stressed is its 
good performance -very close to EU average- in crucial for the reform and adaptation 
capacity indicators, such as government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
control of corruption and political stability. Hence, from macro-analytical perspective, 
Portugal’s position vis-à-vis the other EU member states is depicted within a group of 
medium-performing West European countries with a few exceptions of Eastern Europe. 
This is also vindicated by the cluster analysis of the QoG study for the EU Commission, 
which puts Portugal in the group two of medium-performing countries, such as France, 
Spain, Belgium, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia and Slovenia (see CEC, 2010c). However, as for 
social and institutional trust, Portugal demonstrates very low level on both fronts, and 
with institutional trust significantly declining during the crisis (see Figures 14, 15, 16). 
Nonetheless, these features of Portugal’s institutional infrastructure, and especially the 
comparatively higher level of QoG, can account for the comparatively better 
administrative capacity and for generally better policy outcomes in comparison with 
                                                 
23 Institutions included here are: national parliament, legal system, police, political parties and politicians.     
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Greece. Thus Portugal’s better reform and adaptation capacity, underpinned by higher 
levels of QoG, can account for the country’s better performance in response to both the 
Europeanisation-induced and the MoU-induced –stricter- policy conditionality during the 
crisis24. It is in that respect that Portugal entered the period of crisis in a much better 
shape than Greece and managed to complete the programme promptly and is outside 
MoU and “troika” monitoring since 2014-15. Yet, the country’s institutional profile points 
to a rather top-down process of adjustment, namely a process successfully handled/driven 
by the state without societal/civil society participation. Finally, the case of Portugal can be 
viewed as an outsider that puts a serious challenge to fundamental assumptions of the so 
called institutionalist theory of trust about the link between the quality of formal 
institutional infrastructure and quality of government at large on the one hand and social 
trust on the other.    
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper discusses the relevance primarily of the concepts of Varieties of Capitalism and 
Quality of Government and secondarily of social and institutional trust to accounting for 
the variation in adaptation capacity and performance between Greece and Portugal both 
to Europeanisation-induced and MoUs-induced policy conditionality. The main emphasis 
has been on the policy areas of macroeconomic adjustment, structural and labour market 
reforms and cohesion policy. While the empirical evidence seems to vindicate the 
fundamental assumptions of the Varieties of Capitalism approach with regard to the 
impact of variation among member states of the Eurozone in terms of models of 
capitalism/political economy on the crisis in southern Europe in general, and Greece and 
Portugal in particular, Quality of Government is identified as a key explanatory variable for 
variation in adaptation/adjustment capacity between the two countries, especially during 
the period of crisis. Additionally, there seems to be no evidence that social capital/social 
trust, can account for variation in the adaptation performance between the two countries 
during the crisis. 
 
Thus Greece is characterized as a typical laggard in terms of reform and adaptation 
capacity demonstrating low level of quality of government in all relevant measures and 
indicators but also very low level so social and institutional trust. Conversely, Portugal 
constitutes an interesting outsider, demonstrating medium to high levels of quality of 
government, but simultaneously low levels of social and institutional trust. In that respect, 
while Greece is viewed as a typical case vindicating the so called institutional theory of 
trust, which emphasizes the role of formal state institutions and institutional performance 
at large in the creation of social trust, the case of Portugal does not vindicate and actually 
poses a serious challenge to that theory. 
                                                 
24 It has to be reminded that despite its delayed, in comparison with Greece, admission to the EC/EU –
Portugal joined the EU only in 1986- the country successfully managed both the process of catching up to 
the challenges of Europeanization and the adaptation and adjustment during the crisis period.   
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Finally, the empirical evidence points to scepticism with regard to the increased role of 
agency in accelerating the reform process during periods of critical juncture, assumed by 
the theory of institutional change. In particular, taking into account that the MoUs-
induced policy conditionality is supposed to be dominated by critical juncture-like logic of 
external policy conditionality and therefore emphasizes the role of agency vis-à-vis 
preexisting institutional structures in the reform and adaptation processes, the empirical 
evidence seems to challenge, partly at least, this assumption, given that both countries, 
but primarily Greece, seem to demonstrate symptoms of persistence of preexisting 
institutional structures in the reform and adaptation processes in several policy areas 
during the crisis.        
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Appendix 
Abbreviations 
ALMP  Active Labour Market Policy 
CEC  Commission of the European Communities 
CEE  Central Eastern Europe 
CMEs  Coordinated Market Economies 
CSF  Community Support Framework 
DB  Doing Business 
DG  Directorate General 
DMEs  Dependent Market Economies 
ECB  European Central Bank 
EDP  Excessive Deficit Procedure 
EFSF  European Financial Stability Facility 
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union 
ERDF  European Regional Development Fund 
ESF  European Social Fund 
ESM  European Stability Mechanism 
EU  European Union 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GIIPS  Greece Italy Ireland Portugal Spain 
GPBO  Greek Parliament Budget Office 
HMEs  Hierarchical Market Economies 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IMP  Integrated Mediterranean Programme 
LMEs  Liberal Market Economies 
MMEs  Mixed Market Economies 
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding 
NSRF  National Strategic Reference Framework 
OCA  Optimal Currency Area 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OMC  Open Method of Coordination 
PMR  Product Market Regulation 
PPP  Public Private Partnership 
PRT  Power Resource Theory 
PSI  Private Sector Involvement 
QoG  Quality of Government 
R&D  Research and Development 
SEM  Single European Market 
SGP  Stability and Growth Pact 
SOP  Sectoral Operational Programme 
UKIP  UK Independence Party   
VoC  Varieties of Capitalism 
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